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JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
iview the Utah 
Court of Appeals decision in State v Dean, 2002, UT App323,57 P.3d 1 infl 
reversed the District Court's denial of Respondent's motion to withdraw. The 
jisdiction pursuant lo Ulan u>de 
Annotated Section 78-2-2(3)(a)(Supp. 2002). 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Issut Wheiner rtr n Appeals erred in exercising its 
discretion to address the tic grounds 
Pay< J " I 35 
had not been set forth in Respondent's motion to withdraw plea. 
Issue No. 2: Whether or not the trial court erred in failing to conduct a proper 
colloquy as required Rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, at the time of 
accepting the Respondent's plea of guilty. 
Issue No. 3: Whether or not the trial court erred in denying Respondent's 
motion to withdraw his plea of guilty and by failing to establish the appropriate 
findings on the record. 
Issue No. 4: Whether or not the Respondent was denied the right to counsel 
at the time of sentencing or whether he waived his right to counsel by choosing to 
represent himself when the trial court denied the Respondent's motion to continue. 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
The first issue involves the jurisdictional rule established in State v. Reyes, 
2002, UT 13, ffl[. 3 and 4 which requires that a defendant file a timely motion to 
withdraw a guilty plea and further holds that the failure to do so extinguishes a 
defendant's right to challenge the validity of a plea on appeal. The present case 
takes the argument a step further requiring that Respondent specify precisely all 
issues in the motion to withdraw the plea or otherwise waive the right to raise new 
issues on appeal. In Reyes, since the defendant failed to file a motion to withdraw, 
the issue of preservation was jurisdictional. In concluding, the Utah Supreme Court 
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held that it may choose to review an issue not properly preserved for plain error. 
See State v. Holqate, 2000 Ut. 74, U11,10 P.3d 346. It cannot, however, use plain 
error to reach an issue over which it has no jurisdiction. In the present case, 
because the jurisdictional issue was satisfied by the filing of a motion to withdraw 
albeit non-specific, Reves does not preclude the Court of Appeals from reviewing the 
Respondent's claim on the basis of discretionary review. The Respondent asserts 
that the Court of Appeals did not abuse its discretion in doing so. Consequently, the 
standard of review is believed to be an abuse of discretion standard and should not 
be set aside unless clearly erroneous. The standard of review for claims of plain 
error place a burden upon the Respondent of showing (i)[a]n error existed; (ii) the 
error should have been obvious to the trial Court; and (iii) the error is harmful. See 
State v. Hittle. 2002 UT App. 134, fl 5, 47 P.3d 101. 
Respondent believes that the next two issues presented for review are 
procedural in nature and are reviewed under the abuse of discretion or clearly 
erroneous standard. An appellate court will review a trial court's denial of a motion 
to withdraw a plea under an abuse of discretion standard; the trial court's findings of 
fact made in conjunction with its discretion will not be set aside unless they are 
clearly erroneous. See State v. Thurman. 911 P.2d 371 (Utah, 1996). It is an abuse 
of discretion to deny Respondent's motion to withdraw his plea if he did not have full 
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knowledge and understanding of the consequences of his plea. See State v. 
Valsilacopulos. 756 P.2d 92(Ut. App.), cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988). 
The trial court has the burden of ensuring strict compliance with Rule 11, Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure. State v. Visser. 2000 UT 88, If 11. The ultimate 
question of whether the trial court strictly complied with the requirements is a 
question of law that is reviewed for correctness. See State v. Benvenuto, 983 P.2d 
556, 558 (Utah 1999). 
The fourth issue, the Respondent's right to counsel of his choosing, is one that 
Respondent believes involves a legal question and therefore the correctness 
standard applies. This is done without according any difference to the trial court's 
legal conclusions. See Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497 (Utah 1989). 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The statutory provisions which Respondent believes to be applicable are as 
follows: 
1. The Utah State Constitution Article 1, Section 12. 
2. Rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, 1953, as amended. 
3. Utah Code Annotated §78-2-2(3)(a) (1953, as amended). 
4. Utah Code Annotated §77-13-6 (1953, as amended). 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE of the CASE: This matter concerns the Respondent, WALLACE 
WAYNE DEAN, who on or about the 8th day of March, 2000, entered into a statement 
of defendant regarding plea bargain whereby he agreed to plead guilty to count I, 
child abuse, a second degree felony, count III, child abuse, a class A misdemeanor 
and count V, assault, a class B misdemeanor, as contained in the original 
information. It was agreed that the remaining charges be dismissed, no additional 
charges filed and the State recommend the preparation of a presentence 
investigation report. See the Record at page 35. 
On or about the 18th day of February, 2000, the Respondent was taken into 
custody for drinking in violation of his probation. The Cedar City Police Department 
searched the residence and arranged to take his children into protective custody. 
The Respondent's wife, the mother of the children, died on or about the 8th day of 
January, 2000, from alcoholism and cirrhosis, failure of the liver. After interviewing 
the children, charges were filed against the Respondent for assault and abuse. 
At the time of entering the plea of guilty, the Respondent was represented by 
Dale Sessions, the public defender. Thereafter, Respondent retained D. Bruce 
Oliver to represent him in the filing of a motion to withdraw his guilty plea which was 
filed on or about the 10th day of April, 2000, see the Record at page 40. Retained 
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counsel requested a continuance to accommodate a conflict and become familiar 
with the facts in the case. It is unclear what transpired thereafter, but appears the 
trial court declined to continue sentencing, allowed Mr. Sessions to withdraw as 
appointed counsel and required the Respondent to speak in his own behalf without 
the assistance of counsel. See the minutes of the Record at page 46; see also the 
Record at page 53. 
The Judgment, Sentence and Commitment, states that the Respondent was 
present with his attorney, Dale Sessions, and that the court reviewed the file and 
heard statements from him, his attorney and others, being fully advised of the 
premises before making and entering its judgment, sentence, and commitment. The 
judgment does not appear to address the Respondent's outstanding motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea or the request for continuance. See the Record at page 57. 
No findings were made with regard to those issues. Notice of Appeal was filed on 
or about the 20th day of April, 2000. See the Record at page 64. While pending on 
appeal, Respondent made a motion to proceed in forma pauper, requesting the 
State to bare the transcript cost relevant to the appeal, and reappoint the public 
defender to represent him on appeal. See the Record at page 62. The case was 
assigned to William Leigh an Iron County Public Defender. J. Bryan Jackson was 
substituted as counsel for WALLACE WAYNE DEAN, filed on or about the 4th day 
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of October, 2001. See Addendum, Exhibit I. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION: On or about the 18th day 
of February, 2000, the Respondent was taken into custody and his children taken 
into protective custody. During the investigation, the children were questioned and 
allegations were made alleging child abuse and assault against the Respondent. 
The Respondent was originally charged on six (6) counts the severity ranging from 
child abuse to threat against life or property, one (1) first degree felony, three (3) 
class A and two (2) class B misdemeanors. See the Record at page 4. No 
preliminary hearing was held. See minutes of the Record at page 25; see also a 
copy thereof at Addendum, Exhibit B. 
At the time set for preliminary hearing, March 8th, 2000, the Respondent 
executed a statement of defendant regarding plea bargain, pleading guilty to count 
I, child abuse, a second degree felony, count III, child abuse, a class A 
misdemeanor, and count V, assault, a class B misdemeanor as contained in the 
original information. The remaining charges were dismissed, no additional charges 
filed and the State recommended the preparation of a presentence investigation 
report. 
The trial court did not go through its usual colloquy to establish that the plea 
was voluntary or knowingly made and did not advise Respondent of his right to a 
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speedy public trial before an impartial jury or that by entering into the plea 
Respondent would be waiving those rights. The matter was set for sentencing on 
the 11th day of April, 2000. Id. 
On or about the 10th day of April, 2000, the Respondent filed a motion to 
withdraw plea through retained counsel, D. Bruce Oliver, and requested a 
continuance of sentencing to accommodate a conflict in retained counsel's schedule 
and to allow for additional time to become familiar with case. See the Record at 
page 40. 
On the 11th day of April, 2000, the matter came before the trial court, and 
Respondent was sentenced to prison pursuant to the recommendation of Adult 
Probation and Parole. See the minutes of the Record at page 46. 
On or about the 11th day of April, 2000, the trial court filed a judgment, 
sentence and commitment, stating that Respondent was present and appeared in 
person together with his counsel of record, Dale Sessions, and that the court had 
reviewed the file and heard statements of the defendant, his attorney and others and 
having been fully advised of the premises made and entered the following Judgment, 
Sentence, Stay of Execution of Sentence, Order of probation and Commitment. See 
the Record at page 57. The Respondent was adjudged and decreed guilty of the 
offenses to which he plead guilty, sentenced to the term of one (1) to fifteen (15) 
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years in the Utah State Prison and placed in the custody of the Utah State 
Department of Corrections and committed to the Iron County Sheriff to deliver him 
to the Utah State Prison in Draper, Utah. Id. 
There was no stay of execution of sentence or order of probation as part of the 
judgment, sentence and commitment. There were no findings regarding the 
Respondent's motion to withdraw plea or regarding Mr. Oliver's appearance as 
counsel or his request for continuance. See the Record at page 57. While pending 
on appeal, a motion was made to proceed in forma pauper requesting that the State 
bare the transcript cost and the reappointment of the public defender on appeal. See 
the Record at page 62. In October, 2001, J. Bryan Jackson, appeared as counsel 
for WALLACE WAYNE DEAN, substituting for the public defender appointee. See 
the Addendum, Exhibit I. 
The Court of Appeals reviewed the matter and reversed on grounds of plain 
error that the trial court failed to strictly comply with Rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure. The State petitioned for writ of certiorari, and the same was granted by 
the Utah Supreme Court on the 12th day of February, 2003. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS: 
1. On or about the 18th day of February, 2000, the Respondent was arrested 
and taken into custody for violating his probation. His children were taken into 
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protective custody. During investigation, it was discovered that the children 
complained of child abuse and charges were filed against the Respondent, originally 
six (6) counts ranging from child abuse to threat against life or property and ranging 
from a first degree felony to class B misdemeanors. 
2. No preliminary hearing was held. However, at the time the matter was set 
for preliminary hearing, March 8, 2000, the Respondent executed a statement of 
defendant regarding plea bargain, pleading guilty to count I, child abuse, a second 
degree felony, count III, child abuse a class A misdemeanor, and count V, assault, 
a class B misdemeanor, as contained in the original information. See statement of 
defendant regarding plea bargain on page 35 of the Record; see a copy of statement 
at Addendum, Exhibit A. 
3. The pleas of guilty were entered upon the understanding that the remaining 
charges would be dismissed, no additional charges filed and the State recommend 
the preparation of a presentence investigation report. Id. 
4. The trial court did not conduct a proper colloquy to establish that the plea 
was voluntary and entered knowingly and did not advise Respondent of his right to 
a speedy public trial before an impartial jury. See hearing transcript of March 8th, 
2000, at pages 1 to 7. See also a copy thereof at Addendum, Exhibit J. 
5. The matter was set for sentencing on the 11th day of April, 2000. 
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6. On the 10th day of April, 2000, the Respondent filed a motion to withdraw 
plea, through retained counsel, D. Bruce Oliver, and requested a continuance of 
sentencing to accommodate a conflict in retained counsel's calendar and to allow for 
additional time to become familiar with the case. See the Record at page 40; see 
also a copy of motion at Addendum, Exhibit C. 
7. On the 11th day of April, 2000, the matter came before the trial court and 
the Respondent was sentenced to prison pursuant to the recommendation of Adult 
Probation and Parole. The minute entry states that attorney Sessions was allowed 
to withdraw and the Defendant proceed pro se. See minutes in the Record at page 
46; see also a copy thereof at Addendum, Exhibit D. 
8.. On or about the same day, the trial court filed a judgment, sentence and 
commitment, stating that the Respondent was present and appeared before the court 
in person together with his counsel of record, Dale Sessions, and stated that the 
court had reviewed the file and heard statements of the Respondent, his attorney 
and others and having been fully advised of the premises, made and entered 
Judgment, Sentence and Stay of Execution of Sentence, Order of Probation and 
Commitment. See the Record at page 57; see also a copy thereof at Addendum, 
Exhibit E. 
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9. The Respondent was adjudged and decreed guilty of the offenses to which 
he plead guilty, sentenced to the term of one (1) to fifteen (15) years in the Utah 
State Prison and placed in the custody of the Utah State Department of Corrections 
and committed to the Iron County Sheriff to deliver him to the Utah State Prison in 
Draper, Utah. Id. 
10. There was no stay of execution of sentence or order of probation as part 
of judgment, sentence and commitment. There were no findings regarding the 
Respondent's motion to withdraw or continuance and no statement of denial in the 
judgment, sentence and commitment. Id. There was a separate order submitted 
and filed the same day which makes no findings and denies Respondent's motions 
making a general reference to the State's opposing memorandum. See the record 
at page 53; see also a copy thereof, Addendum, Exhibit K. 
11. Notice of Appeal was filed on or about the 20th day of April, 2002. See the 
Record at page 64; see also a copy thereof at Addendum, Exhibit F. 
12. While pending on appeal, Respondent's counsel made a motion to 
proceed in forma pauper, requesting the State to bare the transcript cost of appeal 
as well as requesting the reappointment of a public defender. See Addendum at 
Exhibit G. The Respondent also requested the same personally by letter. See the 
Record at page 62; see also a copy of Respondent's letter at Addendum, Exhibit H. 
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13. The case was assigned to William Leigh, an Iron County Public Defender, 
and J. Bryan Jackson was substituted as counsel on or about the 4th day of October, 
2001, although the record does not appear to have the filed notice of substitution of 
counsel, a copy of which is attached to Addendum, Exhibit I. 
14. The matter was addressed by the Court of Appeals on or about the 3rd of 
October, 2002, in State v. Dean. 2002, UT App. 323, a copy of which is attached to 
Addendum, Exhibit L, reversing whereupon the State petitioned for writ of certiorari 
and the same was granted by the Utah Supreme Court on the 12th day of February, 
2003. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
A. 
The Court of Appeals did not abuse its discretion in addressing the plain error 
issue when the jurisdictional requirement had been met in that the Respondent had 
filed a timely motion to withdraw his plea albeit non-specific under the circumstances 
of this case. The State's interpretation of the Utah Supreme Court's decision in 
State v. Reves. 2002 UT 13, limiting the scope of authority or jurisdiction to only 
those issues specifically contained in a motion to withdraw plea defies not only the 
basis for establishing a jurisdictional requirement but effectively eliminates any use 
of the discretionary power of review on the basis of plain error or exceptional 
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circumstances. Moreover, such a restricted interpretation defies practical application 
in that counsel for a defendant intending to withdraw a plea of guilty would have to 
have a complete and comprehensive understanding of all circumstances in the case 
before entering an appearance or filing such a motion which few defense attorneys 
would be willing to do so and therefore defendants in similar circumstances are 
prejudiced in their efforts to retain legal representation for such purposes. Last, 
since by the State's interpretation of jurisdictional appellate authority being limited 
to the specific issues asserted in a motion to withdraw, the concluding language in 
the case is superfluous if not inconsistent when this Court states that it may choose 
to review an issue not properly preserved for plain error. 
B. 
The trial court erred in failing to conduct a complete and proper colloquy as 
required by to Rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, and particularly in failing 
to establish that the plea was voluntary and made knowingly or advised the 
Respondent of his right to a speedy public trial before an impartial jury or of the 
waiver of the same. The burden is on the trial court to strictly comply with 
requirements of Rule 11 and establish a record. In this case, the written statement 
is incomplete. There was no verbal colloquy by the court to speak of and no 
evidence in the record to indicate that counsel had advised Respondent. The type 
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of error, failure to advise of a speedy trial before an impartial jury is one that has 
previously been determined harmful and prejudicial and constitutes good cause for 
withdrawing a plea of guilty. 
C. 
The trial court erred in the denying Respondent's motion to withdraw plea and 
in failing to establish in the record findings for denying the plea. Respondent has a 
statutory right to withdraw his plea pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section 77-13-
6(1953, as amended). The motion was timely under State v. McGee. 2001 UT 69, 
and State v. Ostler. 2001 UT 68. No findings were made in the trial court's order and 
there is confusion in the record as to what actually transpired on April 11th, 2000, 
particularly regarding Respondent's form of legal representation and regarding the 
sentence imposed. There is a need to require that when denying a motion to 
withdraw that the trial court enter findings and establish on the record that the plea 
was entered knowingly and voluntarily and advise a defendant of all his procedural 
and constitutional rights as required under Rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure. 
D. 
The trial court erred in denying Respondent' motion to continue which would 
have allowed him to be represented by retained counsel for sentencing. There is no 
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indication in the record that a short continuance would have unreasonably disrupted 
the orderly processes of justice. The Respondent is entitled to be represented by 
counsel of his choosing so long as it is not an attempt to destroy or impede the 
orderly processes of justice. The trial court refused to continue sentencing or allow 
argument on the motion to withdraw plea. There is no colloquy between the trial 
court and the Respondent to determine if Respondent acted knowingly, intelligently 
and voluntarily in waiving his right to counsel and proceeding pro se. The trial court 
did not the advise the Respondent of the dangers of self representation. There is 
nothing in the record establishing that the Respondent made his choice with eyes 
open as required by State v. Petty, 2000 UT App. 396 and State v. Valencia. 2001 
UTApp. 159. 
ARGUMENTS 
A. 
THE COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
ADDRESSING THE PLAIN ERROR ISSUE WHERE THE JURISDICTIONAL 
REQUIREMENT HAD BEEN MET IN THAT THE RESPONDENT HAD FILED A 
TIMELY MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS PLEA ALBEIT NON-SPECIFIC UNDER 
THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE. 
The foremost and fundamental consideration for the Utah Supreme Court 
considering this matter on the State's petition for writ of certiorari seems, at least to 
the Respondent, to have more to do with the Court of Appeals interpretation of State 
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v. Reyes. 2002 UT 13, and its use of discretionary power for review on the basis 
plain error or exceptional circumstances in cases where the issues are not strictly 
preserved in the proceedings of the lower court. In considering such, the 
Respondent is quick to note that this presents a poor factual model since there were 
a number of Rule 11 and other violations and not all were addressed by the Court 
of Appeals. Notwithstanding, the circumstance that the State seems to be most 
concerned with deals with the inadequacy of the Respondent's motion to withdraw 
his plea which did not specify its basis other than in the most general of terms, i.e., 
"the plea was not taken pursuant to Rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure and 
Utah Code Annotated Section 77-13-6 (1953, as amended) constitutes a violation 
of due process and deprived the Defendant equal protection." See motion to 
withdraw guilty plea of Defendant at the Record at page 40; see also attached as 
Respondent's Exhibit C. The State of Utah responded to the motion in as general 
and confusing terms. The motion was never argued. 
What transpired is that sentencing went forward notwithstanding the fact that 
counsel for Respondent could not be present and had filed a motion for a short 
continuance. The Respondent was given the choice of reappointing the public 
defender by whom he had been persuaded to enter into the plea agreement 
previously and given the choice of public defender or representing himself, the 
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Respondent chose to represent himself. 
Notwithstanding, the court did not inquire into Respondent's ability to 
represent himself, understand the nature of proceedings and the potential 
consequences of the penalties involved in the proceedings nor determined if such 
a waiver of the right to counsel was done knowingly and voluntarily. Instead, the 
court went forward with sentencing and committed the Respondent to prison. 
Moreover, the documentation prepared in conjunction with the proceedings are 
to say the least, ambiguous because they fail to properly represent what transpired 
and in fact give those attempting to review the record and the transcript reason to 
consider the whole matter confused, unsettled and wholly unpreserved on many 
issues including but not limited to that which the State has regarding the plain error 
challenge to the entry of plea. 
The Utah Supreme Court's decision in Reves seems to make at least one 
restriction in the Court of Appeal's discretionary powers to review the proceedings 
of the lower court regarding a challenge to a plea on appeal by requiring that a 
defendant move to withdraw his guilty plea within the jurisdictional thirty (30) day 
period to address the issue on appeal. Since the defendant in that case failed to file 
a motion to withdraw his guilty plea the Utah Supreme Court was quick and definitive 
in dismissing the appeal and in doing so concluded: 
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This Court may choose to review an issue not properly preserved for 
plain error. See State v. Holqate, 2000, Utah 74 at H11,10 P.3d 346. 
It cannot, however, use plain error to reach an issue over which it has 
no jurisdiction. 
The State takes the position that the scope of authority goes beyond the mere 
filing of a motion to withdraw a plea, the jurisdictional requirement, but considers it 
a limit and restriction to the specific issues contained within the motion itself. The 
Respondent contends that such an interpretation is far too restrictive and runs 
contrary to the liberal pleading policies that are generally considered the basis for 
the present rules of procedure both civil and criminal. Moreover, it fails to take into 
account the circumstances of this case which are by no means isolated. A 
defendant desires to withdraw his plea and therefore arranges to retain counsel to 
do so. It would not be difficult to foresee that the attorney would act quickly and with 
brevity to meet jurisdictional requirements of timely filing anticipating that the details 
and substance of the motion could be dealt with at the time of argument or by 
supplemental memoranda. The State's position on the issue requires that any new 
attorney, before considering whether he assist a defendant in withdrawing a plea of 
guilty, would have to have a complete and comprehensive understanding of all 
circumstances before entering his appearance or filing such a motion. It is clear 
what the consequence of that would be. Very few defense attorneys would come to 
the aide of defendants. 
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The Respondent asserts that such was not the intention of the Supreme Court 
in its ruling in the Reyes case. The Respondent asserts that the Utah Court of 
Appeals was reasonable in its interpretation that the filing of a motion to withdraw 
the plea met the jurisdictional requirements and therefore it was a matter of their 
discretionary review to consider any issues regarding plain error. In the instant case, 
they were numerous. However, the Court of Appeals saw fit to only address the 
most obvious which was the trial court's failure to strictly comply with Rule 11 in that 
the written plea agreement did not specifically use the appropriate language of 
waiving his right to a speedy public trial before an impartial jury. This was a matter 
established by precedent as being harmful. Since the decision amounted to a 
reversal, the Court of Appeals declined to address the remaining issues raised by 
the Respondent. 
The Respondent includes those issues as they were raised before the Court 
of Appeals to be considered in conjunction with the issues presented by the State 
on its petition for writ of certiorari and begs pardon to exclude them if they go beyond 
the scope this review. Notwithstanding, there is at least a point to be made that the 
Court of Appeals' decision to exercise its discretion to review the matter may have 
had to do in part with the fact that there were several other indiscretions in 
scrutinizing the proceedings of the lower court in this particular case. 
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The Respondent believes that this case was a matter of discretionary review 
and therefore the appropriate standard of the Utah Supreme Court should be one of 
abuse of that discretion as opposed to simply applying the principles of correctness 
or interpretation of law assuming of course that this Court finds the Court of Appeals' 
interpretation of the Reyes decision as the correct application of the law. 
Finally, the Respondent asserts that the Court of Appeals correctly applied the 
plain error standard under the circumstances of this case where the written plea 
agreement was inadequate and the colloquy from the bench failed to establish the 
essential requirements of Rule 11 prior to the acceptance of the plea of guilty. Since 
a right to a speedy public trial before an impartial jury is a substantial constitutional 
right, the need to make a separate finding of harm is unnecessary and presumed to 
be harmful if the trial court fails to inform a defendant accordingly. 
B. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONDUCT A COMPLETE AND 
PROPER COLLOQUY AS REQUIRED PURSUANT TO RULE 11, UTAH RULES 
OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, AND PARTICULARLY IN FAILING TO 
ESTABLISH THAT THE PLEA WAS VOLUNTARY OR THAT RESPONDENT 
WAS ADVISED OF HIS RIGHT TO A SPEEDY PUBLIC TRIAL BY AN 
IMPARTIAL JURY. 
Recent Utah Supreme Court and Court of Appeals decisions have been 
explicit in setting forth the requirements for accepting a plea. However, the 
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procedure is one that has been in place for some time. Rule 11 (e), Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure requires that a trial court may not accept a plea of guilty until it 
has found that: 
... (3) the Defendant knows of his right to the presumption of innocence, 
the right against compulsory self incrimination, the right to a speedy 
public trial before an impartial iurv. the right to confront and cross 
examine in open Court the prosecution witnesses, the right to compel 
the attendance of defense witnesses, and that by entering the plea, 
those rights are waived. (Emphasis added). 
It has been well established that the trial court has the burden of 
ensuring strict compliance with this rule. See State v. Gibbons. 740 P.2d 1309, 
1312, 1313, (1987); see also State v. Hoff. 814 P.2d 1119, 1122 (Utah 1991). In 
considering this requirement in State v. Visser, 2000 UT 88 at fl 11, the Utah 
Supreme Court stated: 
This means "that the trial court [must] personally establish the 
Defendant's guilty plea is truly knowing and voluntary and establish on 
the record that the Defendant knowingly waived his or her constitutional 
rights" (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). Still we have described 
the court's duty in this regard as a duty of "strict" compliance (citations 
omitted). Strict compliance, however, does not mandate a particular 
script or rote recitation of the rights listed (citations omitted). We must 
thus reemphasize that the substantive goal of Rule 11 is to ensure that 
defendants know of their right and thereby understand that basic 
consequence of their decision to plead guilty. That goal should not be 
over shadowed or undermined by formalistic ritual. Id at U11. 
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The ultimate question of whether the trial court strictly complied with the 
requirements of Rule 11 as well as constitutional and procedural requirements for 
entry of plea of guilty is a question of law that is reviewed for correctness. See State 
v. Benvenuto. 983 P.2d 556, 558 (Utah 1999) (quoting State v. Holland. 921 P.2d 
430, 433 (Utah 1996). A failure to comply with the requirements of Rule 11 
constitutes plain error and the Respondent has the burden of showing (i) an error 
exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is 
harmful. See State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201,1208 (Utah 1993). Where the trial court 
fails to conduct a Rule 11 colloquy on the record and particularly where the trial court 
fails to advise a defendant of his or her constitutional right to a speedy public trial 
before an impartial jury is determined prejudicial and harmful. See State v. Ostler. 
2000 UT App. 28; see also State v. Tarnawiecki. 2000 UT App. 186. 
In the instance case, the Respondent, while represented by the public 
defender's office, entered into a statement regarding plea bargain, filed March 8th, 
2000, see the Record at page 35; see also attached Respondent's Addendum, 
Exhibit A. The statement makes no mention of Respondent's right to a speedy 
public trial by an impartial jury or the effect of his waiving such right by entering into 
a plea bargain. 
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The transcript for the hearing on March 8th, 2000, identifies the hearing as a 
preliminary hearing. However, no preliminary hearing was conducted. Rather, the 
plea was entered pursuant to the statement of the defendant regarding plea bargain 
and while guilty pleas were entered to counts I, III and V and some explanation 
offered by counsel as to certain commentary added to the written instrument, the trial 
court asked no questions regarding Respondent's competency, the voluntariness of 
the plea, or his understanding of the circumstances that by him executing the 
statement and entering into the plea bargain he waived certain procedural and 
constitutional rights. See hearing transcript of March 8th, 2000, pages 1 through 7; 
see also a copy thereof at Addendum, Exhibit J. Moreover, the trial court did not 
advise the Respondent as to his right to a speedy public trial before an impartial jury 
and further failed to advise the Respondent that by entering into such statement he 
would be waiving his right to a speedy public trial before an impartial jury and since 
the area is one not covered in the written statement and it being further 
unestablished as to whether or not counsel had advised the Respondent of such 
right and waiver, the Respondent asserts that the same constitutes plain error and 
therefore the Court of Appeals acted appropriately in considering the matter at its 
discretion. The Respondent further asserts that the trial court's failure to strictly 
comply with Rule 11 constitutes good cause for the withdrawal of his plea. See 
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State v. Smith. 812 P.2d 470 (Ut App. 1991). 
C. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN THE DENYING RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO 
WITHDRAW PLEA AND IN FAILING TO ESTABLISH ON THE RECORD 
FINDINGS FOR DENYING THE PLEA. 
The Respondent has a statutory right to withdraw his plea as established by 
the terms and restrictions set forth in Utah Code Annotated Section 77-13-6 (1953, 
as amended). A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon good 
cause shown and with leave of the court. A request to withdraw a plea of guilty shall 
be made within thirty (30) days after the entry of the plea. In the instant case, the 
plea was entered on March 8th, 2000. Respondent's motion to withdraw the plea 
was filed on April 10th, 2000, the day the Respondent retained private counsel for 
that purpose.1 Notwithstanding the issue as to the timeliness of the motion, the 
circumstances of this particular matter are peculiar in that from the Court's minutes 
in the record on April 11*, 2000, it indicates that the court denied the Respondent's 
i 
Counsel for Respondent concedes that since March has thirty-one (31) days, the 
calculation of time as computed by the Respondent or his former counsel may not have 
been accurate as it appears to this attorney that Friday, April 7th, 2000, was the thirtieth 
and final day to file the motion to withdraw plea. However, in State v. McGee. 2001 UT 69, 
the Utah Supreme Court made clear that in computing the statutory thirty (30) day period 
regarding a motion to withdraw a plea, the same begins to run at the time the trial court 
enters a final judgment of conviction based on the plea. See paragraph 8. This was also 
the position taken in State v. Ostler. 2001 UT 68 which purports to have overruled the 
holding in State v. Price, that the statutory thirty (30) day limit runs from the colloquy. 
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motion through retained counsel, D. Bruce Oliver, with an indication that the judge 
stated his grounds for denying the motion which are not reflected in the minutes and 
further not found in the resulting document of that day's hearing, the Judgment, 
Sentence and Commitment. See the minutes of April 11th, 2000, at the Record, page 
47; see also a copy thereof at Addendum, Exhibit D. In fact, the Judgment, 
Sentence and Commitment represents that the Respondent appeared before the 
court in person with his attorney of record, Dale Sessions, Respondent's previously 
appointed counsel, and further states that the court having been fully advised makes 
and enters a judgment, sentence, stay of execution of sentence, order of probation 
and commitment wherein the minutes clearly show that there was no stay of 
execution of sentence or order of probation made by the Court and that Dale 
Sessions was released by the Court as counsel for the Respondent prior to 
sentencing. See the minutes in the Record at page 47; see also a copy thereof at 
Addendum, Exhibit D. Compare the Record page 57; see also a copy fo the 
Judgment, Sentence and Commitment at Addendum, Exhibit E. 
Also filed on April 11th, 2000, was an order on the motion to withdraw guilty 
plea which simply states that the trial court having considered the motion to withdraw 
guilty plea, denies said motion on the grounds set forth in State's response. See the 
Record at page 53; see also a copy thereof at Addendum, Exhibit K. 
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The Court of Appeals has previously ruled that it is an abuse of discretion to 
refuse to allow a defendant to withdraw a plea of guilty which was not made in strict 
compliance with Rule 11. See State v. Trujillo-Martinez, 814 P.2d 596 (Ut. App. 
1991). That has also been the ruling of the Utah Supreme Court. See State v. 
Gibbons. 740 P.2d 1309,1312-14 (Utah 1987). While the cases do not address the 
issue directly there is a strong inference from them that the trial court must establish 
findings or at least articulate its basis for denying a motion to withdraw a plea. 
Respondent contends that when the basis of the motion concerns the trial court's 
failure to strictly comply with Rule 11, the burden is upon the trial court to establish 
that the defendant's guilty plea was truly knowing and voluntary and establish on the 
record that he knowingly waived his or her constitutional rights. 
In other words, there must be evidence in the record or from the 
circumstances of the case indicating that a defendant was advised of his right to a 
speedy public trial by an impartial jury as well as all other procedural and 
constitutional rights and that the same were waived knowingly and voluntarily. In the 
instant case, there is no evidence in the record establishing these factors and the 
circumstances of the case do no support even the speculation that the Respondent 
was advised accordingly. It is clear that the trial court did not personally establish 
through colloquy, either written or verbal that the requirements of Rule 11 had been 
Page 27 of 35 
met. Moreover, the order signed and filed by the court makes no findings and fails 
to give any explanation of the ruling except to refer to the memorandum of the State 
in general. Consequently, one can only draw a conclusion as to the basis for the 
Respondent's motion by speculating as to the Court's intention in referring generally 
to the State's opposing memorandum. Hence, the confusion and misunderstanding 
can in large part be attributed to this lack of clarity and simplicity. It could have all 
been avoided had the trial court interrogated the Respondent with the routinely 
asked questions of oral colloquy at the time of accepting the plea. 
D. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO 
CONTINUE ALLOWING HIM TO BE REPRESENTED BY HIS RETAINED 
COUNSEL AT THE TIME OF SENTENCING WHERE A SHORT 
CONTINUANCE WOULD NOT HAVE UNREASONABLY DISRUPTED THE 
ORDERLY PROCESSES OF JUSTICE UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES. 
The circumstances of this present case are a bit unusual in that the trial court's 
denial of Respondent's motion to withdraw plea and to continue and proceed with 
sentencing effectively denied him his right to be represented by the attorney of his 
choosing, D. Bruce Oliver, and forced him to decide upon representation by 
appointed counsel, Dale Sessions, the Iron County Public Defender or to represent 
himself. The Respondent decided to represent himself although it specifies in the 
Judgment, Sentence, and Commitment that the Respondent was represented by 
Page 28 of 35 
Dale Sessions. The trial court sets forth no findings and the record discloses no 
reason as to why Respondent's motion to continue was denied. The circumstances 
give rise to an issue of first impression regarding to scope of the Respondent's right 
to counsel. In Webster v. Jones, 587 P.2d 528 (Utah 1978), in the context of 
addressing a related issue, the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
We are in accord in the contention of the Plaintiff that where a person 
is charged with an offense which may be punished by imprisonment, he 
is entitled to the assistance of counsel.... this assures an accused the 
right to representation by an attorney of his choice if he is able to 
employ counsel, or if he is indigent and unable to obtain counsel, he is 
entitled to a court appointed attorney. Id at 530, citing to Glenn v. 
United States. 303 F.2d 536 (5th Cir. 1962). (Emphasis added). 
In State v. Wulffenstein, 733 P.2d 120, appeal dismissed, certiorari denied 
108 S. CT. 47,484 U.S. 803,98 L.Ed. 2d 12, the Utah Supreme Court further refined 
the right to counsel with regard to appointed counsel first stating that an accused is 
entitled to employ counsel of his choice and then stating that he does not have an 
immutable right under the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution or 
under our State Constitution to reject appointed counsel for the purpose of forcing 
the Court to appoint private counsel of his choice to represent him, absent a showing 
of good cause for such a change. Id at 121. The Court went on to state that the 
accused is entitled to the effective assistance of a competent member of the State 
bar who is willing to identify the interests of the defendant and present the available 
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defenses. Id. Further, the Court held that the right to counsel does not include the 
right of the defendant to designate his own court appointed counsel by either process 
of affirmative demand or the selective elimination of other attorneys. Id at 121-122. 
Much of the judicial analysis in Utah has been directed toward the 
development of the right to counsel in the context of effective assistance of 
appointed counsel and in establishing a basis for determining whether one's 
ineffective assistance rises to the level of denying a defendant his or her right to 
counsel, e.g. State v. Johnson. 823 P.2d 484f (Ut. App. 1991) (the right to effective 
assistance of counsel requires courts to balance a defendant's constitutional right 
to retain counsel with a need to maintain the highest standards of professional 
responsibility, the public's confidence in the integrity of the judicial process and the 
orderly administration of justice); see also St. George v. Smith. 828 P.2d 504 (Ut. 
App. 1992) (the right to counsel does not entail a right to appointed counsel of one's 
choosing or to be represented by a lay person or unlicensed attorney). 
Recently, the Utah Court of Appeals in State v. Petty. 2001 UT App. 396, 
considered the issue of right to counsel in the context of waiver under circumstances 
similar to the present case but with one clear distinction. In Petty, the defendant was 
appointed counsel and chose to represent himself. The trial court engaged in a brief 
colloquy and allowed the defendant to proceed pro se. Id at fl 3. The defendant 
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later argued that his waiver of counsel was not knowingly and intelligently made. 
The Court of Appeals addressed the matter from the standpoint of waiver. The 
standard of review was determined to be a mixed question of fact and law to be 
reviewed for correctness but with "a reasonable measure of discretion" given to the 
trial court's application of the facts to the law. Id at 1J 4; see also State v. Valencia, 
2001 UTApp. 159 at U 11. 
In its analysis, the Court of Appeals stated as follows: 
In making this determination [whether or not defendant's right to waive 
representation and proceed pro se is made knowingly, intelligently and 
voluntarily] we require a trial court to conduct a colloquy on the record 
(citations omitted) and advise the defendant of the dangers and 
disadvantages of self representation "so that the record will establish 
that the [defendant] knows what he is doing and his choice is made 
eyes open." Id at fl 6; see also State v. Heaton. 958 P.2d 918, 917 
(Utah 1998). 
Other jurisdictions have addressed the right to counsel in a slightly different 
fashion. In State v. Zaha. 605 P.2d 306 (Or App. 1980), the Oregon Court of 
Appeals found as follows: 
The right to counsel carries with it a right to counsel of one's choice. 
The corollary right of choice, however, is subject to judicial discretion 
if accommodation of the right to counsel would result in a "destruction 
of the orderly processes of justice unreasonably under the 
circumstances of a particular case." Id at page 307. 
Where a defendant's motion for continuance and the removal of a court 
appointed attorney was not an attempt to destroy or impede the "orderly processes 
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of justice" the Oregon court held that the trial court's failure to allow a continuance 
to allow the defendant to proceed with counsel of his choice was in error and was 
reversed and remanded for new trial. 
In the present case, the Respondent was more or less forced into the position 
to represent himself in that he refused to be represented by appointed counsel and 
was requesting that the trial court continue the matter to allow him to be represented 
by counsel of his choice. There is nothing suggested from the record or from the 
minutes of the hearing that would indicate that a short continuance would in any way 
destroy or impede the orderly processes of justice. 
Moreover, the trial court did not conduct the colloquy as required and therefore 
the record fails to show that the Respondent was advised of the dangers and 
disadvantages of self representation and fails to establish that he knew what he was 
doing or that his choice was made with eyes open. The trial court did not inform the 
Respondent of his constitutional right to counsel and his right to represent himself. 
The trial court did not determine that the Respondent had the intelligence and 
capacity to understand and appreciate the consequence of his decision to represent 
himself and did not make certain that the Respondent comprehended the nature of 
the charges and proceedings, the range of permissible punishments and any 
additional facts essential to a broad understanding of the case. 
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Moreover, the trial court did not establish through colloquy whether 
Respondent's waiver of the assistance of counsel was knowingly made. 
Consequently, under the circumstances of the present case, the Respondent 
asserts that the trial court erred in denying him the right to be represented by counsel 
of his choice and requiring him to proceed with sentencing pro se. 
CONCLUSION 
On the grounds and for the reasons set forth above, Respondent, WALLACE 
WAYNE DEAN, prays that relief be granted in affirming the Court of Appeals 
decision to reverse that of the trial court and remanding to allow the Respondent to 
withdraw his plea with such other and further relief as to this Court appears equitable 
and proper. /? 
DATED this V 2 ^ a y of. 
J. BRYAN JACKSON, 
Attorney for Respondent Dean 
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EXHIBIT "A" 
Statement of the Defendant Regarding 
Plea Bargain, Certificate of Counsel, and 
Order. 
DAVID E. DOXEY (#7506) 
Deputy Iron County Attorney 
97 North Main, Suite #1 
P.O. Box 428 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 
Telephone: (435) 586-6694 
Facsimile: (435) 586-2737 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
WALLACE WAYNE DEAN 
Defendant 
STATEMENT OF THE DEFENDANT 
REGARDING PLEA BARGAIN, 
CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL, and 
ORDER 
Criminal No. 001500153 
Judge ROBERT T. BRAITHWAITE 
STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT REGARDING PLEA BARGAIN 
I, WALLACE WAYNE DEAN, the above-named Defendant, under oath, hereby 
acknowledge that I have entered a plea of "guilty" to the offense(s) of Child Abuse (Count I), a 
Second-Degree Felony, Child Abuse (Count III), Class A Misdemeanor, and Assault (Count V) a 
Class B Misdemeanor as contained in the original Information on file against me in the above-
entitled Court, a copy of which I have received and read, and I understand the nature of the elements 
of the offense for which I am pleading "guilty." I further understand the charge to which this plea 
of "guilty" is entered is a Second-Degree Felony, a Class A Misdemeanor, and a Class B 
Misdemeanor and that I am entering such a plea voluntarily and of my own free will, after conferring 
with mw Attorney, Dale Sessions, and with a knowledge and understanding of the following facts: 
III JXM • I know that I have constitutional rights under the Constitutions of Utah and the United 
FII Fl J 
5th niSTM'^T OOUFil 
, m o w r o i r s r / j / K o 
DEFUTYCUrr.i". _ ( X - f e l 
States to plead not guilty and to have a jury trial upon the charge to which I have entered a plea of 
guilty, or to a trial by the Court should I elect to waive a trial by jury. 1 know I have a right to be 
represented by counsel and that I am in fact represented by Dale Sessions as my attorney. 
/ j«/ jyl. I know that if I wish to have a trial in Court upon the charge, I have a right to confront 
the witnesses against me by having them testify in open court in my presence and before the Court 
and jury with the right to have those witnesses cross-examined by my attorney. I also know that I 
have the right to have witnesses subpoenaed by the State at its expense to testify in Court on my 
behalf and that I could, if I elected to do so, testify in Court on my own behalf, and that if I choose 
not to do so, the jury can and will be told that this may not be held against me if I choose to have the 
jury so instructed. 
( ) {"!'£' * know that if I were to have a trial that the State must prove each and every element 
of the crime charged to the satisfaction of the Court or jury beyond a reasonable doubt; that I would 
have no obligation to offer any evidence myself; and that any verdict rendered by a jury, whether 
it be that of guilty or not guilty, must be by a unanimous agreement of all jurors, 
f \ ipLk- 1 know that under the Constitutions of Utah and of the United States that I have a 
right against self-incrimination or a right not to give evidence against myself and that this means that 
I cannot be compelled to admit that I have committed any crime and cannot be compelled to testify 
in Court upon trial unless I choose to do so. 
\ \ T **' * know that under the Constitution of Utah that if I were tried and convicted by a jury 
or by the Court that I would have a right to appeal my conviction and sentence to the Supreme Court 
of Utah for review of the trial proceedings and that if I could not afford to pay the costs for such 
appeal, that those costs would be paid by the State without cost to me, and to have the assistance of 
counsel on such appeal. 
f ^ ^r'/A* * know that if I wish to contest the charge against me, I need only plead "not guilty" 
and the matter will be set for trial, at which time the State of Utah will have the burden of proving 
each element of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt. If the trial is before a jury, the verdict must 
be unanimous. I know and understand that by entering a plea of "guilty," I am waiving my 
constitutional rights as set out in the preceding paragraphs and that I am, in fact, fully incriminating 
myself by admitting I am guilty of the crime to which my plea of "guilty" is entered. 
\ IA Jh. I know that under the laws of Utah the possible maximum sentence that can and may 
be imposed upon my plea of "guilty" to the charge identified on page one of this Statement, and as 
set out in the Amended Information, is as follows: 
Count I: Child Abuse 
(A) a term of 1 -15 years in the Utah State Prison 
(B) And/or fined in any amount not in excess of $10,000 dollars. 
Count III: Child Abuse 
(A) a term of 1 year in the Iron County Jail. 
(B) And/or fined in any amount not in excess of $2500 dollars. 
Count V: Assault 
(A) a term of six months in the Iron County Jail 
(B) And/or fined in any amount not in excess of $1,000 
I further understand that the imprisonment may be for consecutive periods if my plea is to 
more than one charge. I also know that if I am on probation, parole, or awaiting sentencing upon 
another offense of which I have been convicted or to which I have pleaded "guilty," my plea in the 
3 
present action may result in consecutive sentences being imposed on me. I also know that I may be 
ordered by the Court to make restitution to any victim or victims of my crime. 
\jj *"'*%: I know that the fact that 1 have entered a plea of "guilty" does not mean that the Court 
will not impose either a fine or sentence of imprisonment upon me and no promises have been made 
to me by anyone as to what the sentence will be if I plead "guilty" or that it will be made lighter 
because of my "guilty" plea. /^l-mrf j/aJ^ 
• \\fl'r 9. No threats/coerCjiopT. or unlawful influence of any kind have been made to induce me 
to plead "guilty," and no promises, except those contained herein, have been made to me. 1 know 
that any opinions made to me, by my attorney or other persons, as to what he or they believe the 
Court may do with respect to sentencing are not binding on the Court. 
O ^1^'4x). I know that under the laws of Utah should I desire to move the Court to set aside my 
"guilty" plea entered in this case, I must do so within thirty (30) days of the entry of the pleas or my 
right to do so will be lost. I further understand that a plea of "guilty" may be withdrawn only upon 
a showing of good cause and with permission of the Court 
i 
, \ A)J i 1. No promises of any kinfiLhave been made to induce me to plead "guilty" except tha 
I have been told that if I do plead yguifty,'}1lheLJSia^^ 
t 
Information therein charging me with Child Abuse, a Second-Degree Felony, Child Abuse a Class 
A Misdemeanor, and Assault a Class B Misdemeanor as opposed to the original charge(s) of Child 
Abuse, a second-degree felony, Child Abuse, a class A misdemeanor, Child Abuse, a class A 
misdemeanor, Commission of Domestic Violence in the Presence of a Child, a class A 
Misdemeanor, Assault a class B Misdemenaor and Threat Against Life or Property, a Class B 
Misdemeanor. I also understand that if I plead guilty as set forth above, the Stale agrees to not file 
4 
additional charges for allegedly threatening my children if they testified against me. I am also aware 
that the State will recommend the preparation of a Presentence Investigation Report. No other 
promises have been made. I am also aware that any charge or sentencing concessions or 
recommendations for probation or suspended sentences, including a reduction of the charges for 
sentencing made or sought by either defense counsel or the prosecutor are not binding on the Court 
and may not be approved or followed by the Court. 
12. I have read this Statement or I have had it read to me by my attorney, and I 
understand its provisions. I know that I am free to change or delete anything contained in this 
Statement. I do not wish to make any changes because all of the statements are correct, 
y • v}. I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my attorney. 
\ k*4r I am D u years of age, I have attended school through the / / grade, and I can 
read and understand the English language. I was not under the influence of any drugs, medication, 
or intoxicants when the decision to enter the plea was made. I am not presently under the influence 
of any drugsAmedication, or intoxicants. 
jwlsr. U I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind, mentally capable of 
understanding the proceedings and the consequences of my plea and free of any mental disease, 
defect or impairment that would prevent me from knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entering 
my plea^ M. \J' 16. I have discussed the contents of this Statement with my Attorney, and ask the Court 
to accept my plea of "guilty" to the charges set forth in this Statement because during 1999 1 did, 
while in an intoxicated state, intentionally and knowingly bum my daughter with a knife that had 
been hecUedaip on the stove, and during on or about January 7, 2000,1 did grab my son by the neck 
and choked him to prevent him from giving Ibuprofen to my deceased wife, and that on that same 
date, I did unlawfully hit my wife. These acts occurred in Iron County, State of Utah. 
DATED Y day of March, 2000 
Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF DEFENSE ATTORNEY 
I certify that I am the attorney for WALLACE WAYNE DEAN, the Defendant named above, 
and I know she has read the Statement, or that I have read it to him; and I discussed it with him and 
believe he fully understands the meaning of its contents and is mentally and physically competent. 
To the best of my knowledge and belief after an appropiiate investigation, the elements of the crime 
and the factual synopsis of the Defendant's criminal conduct are correctly stated, and these, along 
with the other representations and declarations made by the Defendant in the foiegoing Statement, 
are accurate and true. 
^h'sz^syi^^ 
Dale ;Sfessi6ns 
Attorneylor Defef; 
CERTIFICATE OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in its case against WALLACE WAYNE 
DEAN, Defendant. I have reviewed the Statement of the Defendant and find that the declarations, 
including the elements of the offense and the factual synopsis of the Defendant's criminal conduct 
which constitutes the offense are true and correct. No improper inducements, tin eats, or coercions 
n n e r i o 
to encourage a plea have been offered to the Defendant. The plea negotiations are fully contained 
in this Statement or as supplemented on the record before the Court. There is reasonable cause to 
believe the evidence would support the conviction of the Defendant for the offense for which the 
plea is entered and acceptance of the plea would serve the public interest. 
fi 
DAVID E. DOXEY 
Deputy Iron County Attornej 
ORDER 
Based upon the facts set forth in the foregoing Statement of Defendant Regarding Plea 
Bargain and the foregoing Certificates of Counsel, the Court finds the Defendant's plea of "guilty" 
is freely and voluntarily made, and it is so ordered that Defendant WALLACE WAYNE DEAN's 
plea of "guilty" to the charges set forth in the foregoing Statement be accepted and entered. 
The foregoing Statement of Defendant was signed before me this % day of March, 2000. 
ROBERT T. BRAITHWAITE 
District Court Judge 
7 
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EXHIBIT "B" 
Minutes, Preliminary Hearing Notice. 
March 8, 2000 
FIFTH DISTRICT COURT- CEDAR COURT 
IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
WALLACE WAYNE DEAN, 
Defendant. 
MINUTES 
PRELIMINARY HEARING 
NOTICE 
Case No: 001500153 FS 
Judge: ROBERT T. BRAITHWAITE 
Date: March 8, 2 000 
PRESENT 
Clerk: kimp 
Prosecutor: DAVID E. DOXEY 
DALE W SESSIONS 
Defendant 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: November 17, 1961 
Video 
Tape Number: 030800 Tape Count: 9:51 a.m. 
CHARGES 
1. CHILD ABUSE/NEGLECT - 2nd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 03/08/2000 Guilty Plea 
3. CHILD ABUSE/NEGLECT - Class A Misdemeanor 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 03/08/2000 Guilty Plea 
5. SIMPLE ASSAULT - Class B Misdemeanor 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 03/08/2000 Guilty Plea 
6. THREAT AGAINST LIFE/PROPERTY - Class B Misdemeanor 
- Disposition: 03/08/2000 Declined Prosecution 
HEARING 
Mr. Doxey indicates a plea agreement has been reached with the 
defendant. Mr. Doxey outlines the agreement. The defendant agrees 
to plea guilty to counts 1,3,5 and the states agrees to dismiss 
counts 2 and 4. 
The defendant waivs his preliminary hearing and is ordered bound 
over for arraignment. The defendant pleads guilty to counts 1,3,5. 
A PSI is ordered and sentencing is set for 4-11-00 at 1:30 p.m. 
PACT** 1 
Case No; 001500151 
Date: Mar 08, ?()()() 
Mr. Sessions addresses issues of bail The defendant requests 
bail be reduced to $5000 cash or bond. The request is denied. The 
defendant is ordered committed until sentencing. 
SENTENCING is scheduled. 
Date: 04/11/2000 
Time: 01:32 p.m. 
Location: Room 1 
DISTRICT COURT BUILDING 
40 NORTH 100 EAST 
CEDAR CITY, UT 84720 
Before Judge: ROBERT T. BRAITHWAITE 
Page 
EXHIBIT "C" 
Motion to Withdraw Guilty Hlea. 
D. Bruce Oliver #5120 
Attorney for Defendant 
180 South 300 West, Suite 210 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1490 
Telephone: (801) 328-8888 
Fax: (801) 595-0300 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
—~oooOooo 
MOTION TO WITHDRAW 
GUILTY PLEA 
Case No. 001500153 
Judge Robert T. Braithwaite 
Comes now the defendant, Wallace Dean, by and through counsel, D. Bruce Oliver, 
and hereby moves this Court for a withdraw mt 
aware of his rights at tlie time of the entry of his plea, nor did he realize the ramifications of 
the entry of his guilty plea. Based upon mimMiuiuin MMM"1!11 I, I >H< ndyii'\ '< tunsel believes 
that the plea was not taken pursuant to Rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure and Utah 
C nation of due process and deprived 
the defendant equal protection. 
mi ii i,'. I iled pursuant to the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to 
the United States Constitution, Article I, Sections 7, 12, II, 24, and 27 of the 
HLLU 
JODAPR 10 HI k-M 
i;:iJ."F CCUiTY 
Plaintiff, ^ 
) 
vs. 
) 
WALLACE DEAN, ( 
) 
Defendant. ( 
) 
Constitution, and Rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
Furthn iiv ;u c(.iin|j.iiiyiiiu iiiriimrandum of points and authorities is in Support 
of said motion and is incorporated herein and annexed hereto by diis reference. 
RESPECTFUI I V SUBMIT 11 I) ilii.s l(f_. -lay ol 
April, 2000. 
D. BRUCE OLIVER 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF FAXING/MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be transmitted a telef?< 
and I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing MOTION TO WITHDRAW GUILTY 
PLEA, via U.S. Mail, i I'ORNEY'S 
OFFICE, 97 North Main, Suite #1, P.O. Box 428, Cedar City, Utah 84720. 
Iuml iln.s Kih <l,iv ol July, 1998. 
^/ ^ ^ • ^ u p V i 
000;;r; 
EXHIBIT "D" 
Minutes, Sentencing, Judgment, 
Commitment. 
April I 1, 2000 
F I F T H DISTRICT COURT- CEDAR COURT 
IRON COUNTY, STATE OP UTXH 
STATE OP UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
MINUTES 
SENTENCING 
SENTENCE,, JTinGMEN' COMMITMENT 
WALLACE WAYNE DEAN, 
Defendant 
Judge: ROBERT T. BRAITHWAITE 
Date: An-H 1 i 9Q00 
PRESENT 
Clerk: tammyc 
Prosecutor: DAVTr. . .-.;•., 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney (s,» . DALE SESSIONS 
Agency: Fifth District Court 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: November 17, 1961 
Video 
Tape Number: 041100 Tape Count: 1:33 p.m. 
CHARGES 
CHILD ABUSE/NEGLECT - 2nd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 03/08/2000 Guilt" ilea 
CHILD ABUSE/NEGLECT - Class A Misdemeanor 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 03/08/2000 :.;Lliiiy Ilea 
SIMPLE ASSAULT - Class B Misdemeanor 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 03/08/2000 Guilty Plea 
THREAT AGAINST LIFE/PROPERTY - Class B Misdemeanor 
- Disposition: 03/08/2000 Declined Prosecution 
Page 1 
Case No; 0 01500153 
Date: Apr I\, :noo 
HEARING 
TAPE: 041100 COUN'l . 1:J3 p.m. 
On record. The Defendant is incarcerated. Mi . Sessions states he 
received paperwork from Bruce Oliver's office. The court denies 
Mr. Oliver's motion. 
COUNT: 2:0^ ]• 
Mr. Sessions states he has met with the Defendant, but the 
Defendant would like to represent himself in these matters. 
Mr. Sessions is released by the court as counsel for the 
Defendant; however, he is asked to help the Defendant in case the 
Defendant needs counsel for these proceedings. 
COUNT: 2:10 p 
Mr. Doxey responds to the paperwork he received from Bruce Oliver. 
Mr. Sessions asks the court questions regarding his representing 
the Defendant. Judge Braithwaite states his grounds for denying 
Mr. Oliver's motion. 
The court states the PSI refers to this case, as well as an older 
one Case #961500370. Judge Braithwaite asks the Defendant if he is 
ready to go forward on the allegations in Case #961500370, or if he 
would like to have Bruce Oliver here. 
The Defendant would like Bruce Oliver here to help him on the 
Order to Show Cause proceedings on Case #961500370 Judge 
Braithwaite states that the 96' case can be continued, as it is not 
yet ready, but that this case will go forward today. 
COUNT: 2:21 p 
The Defendant responds to the PSI and the agencies 
recommendations. 
COUNT: 2:30 p 
Mr. Sessions makes comments regarding sentencing. 
COUNT: 2:38 p 
Mr. Doxey responds to the PSI and gives sentencing 
recommendations. 
COUNT: 2:42 p 
The court sentences the Defendant to 1-15 years in the Utah State 
Prison. The Defendant's other case #961500370 is re-noticed for 
5-2-00 at 2:30 p.m. 
Paqe 2 00ft\1n 
Case No: 001500153 
Date: Apr 11, 2000 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of CHILD ABUSE/NEGLECT a 2nd 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah 
State Prison. 
To the IRON County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
defendant will be confined. 
Paqe 3 (last) 0G045 
EXHIBIT "E" 
Judgment, Sentence, and 
Commitment. 
DAVID E.DOXEY (#7506) 
Deputy Iron County Attorney 
97 North Main, Suite #1 
P.O. Box 428 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 
Telephone: (435) 586-6694 
Telecopier: (435) 586-2737 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
WALLACE DEAN, 
Defendant. 
JUDGMENT, SENTENCE, and 
COMMITMENT 
Criminal No.001500153 
Judge Robert T. Braithwaite 
The Defendant, WALLACE DEAN, having entered a plea of guilty to the offense of Child 
Abuse, a Second-Degree Felony, Child Abuse, a Class A Misdemeanor, and Assault, a Class B 
Misdemeanor on March 8, 2000, and the Court having accepted said plea of guilty and the above-
entitled matter having been called on for sentencing on April 11, 2000, in Cedar City, Utah, and 
the above-named Defendant, WALLACE DEAN, having appeared before the Court in person 
together with his attorney of record, Dale Sessions, and the State of Utah having appeared by 
and through Deputy Iron County Attorney David E. Doxey, and the Court having reviewed the 
stipulated sentencing recommendation and having further reviewed the file in detail and thereafter 
having heard statements from the Defendant, his attorney, and the Deputy Iron County Attorney, 
and the Court being fully advised in the premises now makes and enters the following Judgment, 
Sentence, Stay of Execution of Sentence, Order of Probation, and CQmmitment, to wit: 
F\LEU 
00l , t j7 
JUDGMENT 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the Defendant, 
WALLACE DEAN, has been convicted upon his plea of guilty to the offense of Child Abuse, a 
Second-Degree Felony, Child Abuse a Class A Misdemeanor, and Assault, a Class B 
Misdemeanor, and the Court having asked whether the Defendant had anything to say in regard to 
why judgment should not be pronounced, and no sufficient cause to the contrary being shown or 
appearing to the Court, it is adjudged that the Defendant is guilty as charged and convicted. 
SENTENCE 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendant, WALLACE DEAN, and pursuant to his 
conviction of Child Abuse, a Second-Degree Felony, Child Abuse a Class A Misdemeanor, and 
Assault, a Class B Misdemeanor is hereby sentenced to a term of one to fifteen (1-15) years in 
the Utah State Prison, and the Defendant is hereby placed in the custody of the Utah State 
Department of Corrections. 
COMMITMENT 
TO THE SHERIFF OF IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH: 
YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED to take the Defendant, WALLACE DEAN, and 
deliver him to the Utah State Prison in Draper, Utah, there to be kept and confined in accordance 
with the above and foregoing Judgment, Sentence, and Commitment. 
DATED this / / day of April, 2000. 
BYTHErDURT: 
.1 
S 
Robell T. Braithwaite 
District Court Judge 
n n A r n 
CERTIFICATE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss. 
COUNTY OF IRON ) 
I, CAROLYN BULLOCH, Clerk of the Fifth Judicial District Court in and for Iron 
County, State of Utah, hereby certify that the foregoing is a full, true and exact copy of the 
original Judgment, Sentence, Stay of Execution of Sentence, Order of Probation, and 
Commitment in the case entitled State of Utah vs WALLACE DEAN. Criminal No.001500153, 
now on file and of record in my office. 
WITNESS my hand and the seal of said office in Cedar City, County of Iron, State of 
Utah, this \1 day of April 2000. 
CAROLYN B 
CAROLYN BULLOCH 
District Court Clerk 
Bv: 0tifW 
Deputy District Court Clerk 
EXHIBIT "F" 
Notice of Appeal. 
T l ! I 1 
S " - -
• ' ; > 
FLOYD W HOLM (1522) 
Attorney for Defendant 
141 North Main, Suite 220 
Cedar City, Utah 84721 
Telephone: (435) 865-5800 
, ^ R Z 8 M.IO:0 
, . c - * t ; " 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
v. 
WALLACE WAYNE DEAN, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Case No. 001500153 
Judge Robert T. Braithwaile 
COMES NOW Floyd W Holm, counsel for the above-named Defendant and gives notice 
of appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals from the Judgement, Sentence and Commitment dated 
April 17, 2000, following the Defendant's conviction by guilty plea to the offenses of Child 
Abuse, a Second-Degree Felony, Child Abuse, a Class A Misdemeanor, and Assault, a Class B 
Misdemeanor. 
DATED THIS o ^ d a y of April, 2000. 
sDti^ 
FLOY^y HOLM 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
EXHIBIT "G" 
Motion to Proceed in Forma Pauper. 
D. Bruce Oliver #5120 
Attorney for Defendant 
180 South 300 West, Suite 210 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1490 
Telephone: (801) 328-8888 
Fax: (801) 595-0300 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH. 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
WALLACE DEAN, 
Defendant. 
MOTION TO PROCEED 
IN FORMA PAUPER 
Case No. 001500153 
Judge Robert T. Braithwaite 
) 
Comes now the defendant, Wallace Dean, by and through counsel, D. 
Bruce Oliver, and hereby moves for the State to bear the transcript costs relevant to this 
matter on appeal. Furthermore, defendant hereby requests the reappointment of Floyd 
W. Holm as public defender appointee in this matter regarding the appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-32-5 (1953, as amended), mandates: 
The expenses of printing or typewriting briefs on first appeals of right on behalf of 
an indigent defendant, as well as depositions and other transcripts shall be paid 
by the state, county, or municipal agency that prosecuted the defendant at trial. 
id. This is Mr. Dean's first appeal of right and as such due to his incarceration he is 
ADDENDUM^ 
indigent and therefore, the state or county should bear the costs of any transcripts. 
The Utah State Constitution Article 1, section 12 provides in pertinent part 
the rights of the accused, as follows: 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in 
person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation 
against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted 
by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel the 
attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by an 
impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been 
committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any 
accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance money or 
fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be 
compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to 
testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any person 
be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense, (emphasis added) 
Utah Const, art. I, § 12. Furthermore, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 21-7-3 an 
impecunious defendant in a criminal case may attest to his indigent status and thereby 
avail himself of his appellate rights. Thte indigent claim must be made in the District 
Court. See, State v. Johnson, 700 P.2d 1125 (Utah 1985). 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the defendant hereby requests the State bear 
the costs of the transcripts on appeal and that the defendant be reappointed the public 
defender, Floyd W. Holm. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 18th day of 
May, 2001. lyC (P. 
v.. 
D. BRUCE OLIVER 
Attorney for Defendant 
2 
CERTIFICATE OF FAXING/MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be transmitted a telefacsimile to (435) 
586-2737 and I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing MOTION TO PROCEED 
IN FORMA PAUPER, via U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, to Scott M Burns, IRON 
COUNTY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE. 97 North Main. Suite f/1, P.O. Box 428, Cedar City, 
Utah 84720. 
Dated this 18th day of May, 2001 
D. Bruce Oliver #5120 
Attorney for Defendant and Appellant 
180 South 300 West, Suite 210 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1490 
Telephone: (801) 328-8888 
Fax: (801) 595-0300 
FILED 
u\ ahCourtofAop^te 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
vs. 
WALLACE DEAN, 
Defendantand Appellant. 
MOTION TO REMAND FOR 
INDIGENCY DETERMINATION 
Case No. T-o^cr^ - fo 
Priority No. 2 
Comes now the defendant, Wallace Dean, by and through counsel, D. 
Bruce Oliver, and hereby moves this Honorable Court to remand this matter to the 
District Court of Iron County, State of Utah. The appellant has filed a Motion in the 
District Court to proceed in forma pauper. (See addendum A). 
The appellant while incarcerated in the Utah State Prison is unable to 
bear the expense for his appeal. The record shows that prior to taking this matter on 
appeal through D. Bruce Oliver, the trial court appointed Floyd W. Holm to represent 
the defendant. Inasmuch, it appears appropriate that Mr. Holm should be reappointed 
as counsel for the defendant and the State should bear the transcript costs relevant to 
this matter on appeal. See, State v. Johnson, 700 P.2d 1125 (Utah 1985). 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the Appellant hereby requests this matter be 
remanded to the District Court for the purpose of indigency determination. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 21st day of 
May, 2001. A). 
D. BRUCE OLIVER 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
MOTION TO REMAND FOR INDIGENCY DETERMINATION, via U.S. Mail, postage 
prepaid, to: 
Christine F. Soltis 
Office of Attorney General 
Criminal Appeals Division 
Heber Wells Building 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
Dated this 21st day of May, 2001. 
EXHIBIT "H" 
Letter from Wallace Wayne Dean to the 
Court of Appeals. 
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Notice of Substitution of Counsel. 
WILLARD R. BISHOP, P. C. 
William H. Leigh - #5307 
Attorney for Defendant 
P. O. Box 279 
Cedar City, UT 84721-0279 
'Telephone: (435) 586-9483 
FILED 
OCT 0 H 2001 
5th DISTRICT COURT 
•RON COUNTY^
 c ( e r k 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF IRON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
WALLACE DEAN, 
Defendant. 
NOTICE OF SUBSTITUTION OF 
COUNSEL 
Case No. 001500153 
COMES NOW WILLIAM H. LEIGH, attorney for Wallace Dean and withdraws 
as Public Defender Appointee and J. BRYAN JACKSON enters his appearance as counsel for 
Wallace Dean in this matter. 
DATED THIS day of October, 2001. 
M / w 
Jryan JJ^ cKkpn, Esq. William H. Leigh, Esq. 
^RTIFICATE OF MAILING AND/OR HAND DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on the day of October, 2001, a copy of the foregoing document 
was mailed and/or hand delivered to the Iron County Attorney, at 97 North Main, #1, P.O. Box 428, 
Cedar City, UT 84721-0428. 
Secretary 
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Transcript of Entry of Plea, March 8, 2000. 
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STATE OF UTAH, 
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Fifth District Court Judge 
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Deputy County Attorney 
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Suite 307 
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Transcribed by: Beverly Lowe, RPR/CSR/CCT 
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Provo, Utah 84606 
Telephone: (801)377-0027 
NOV 2 0 2000 
COURT OF APPE/J 
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-2 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
(Electronically recorded on March 8, 2000) 
THE COURT: We'll go back to the top of the calendar. 
State of Utah versus Wallace Dean. Are we ready on that case? 
MR. DOXEY: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Does this go forward? 
MR. DOXEY: We need to make one quick change, your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. DOXEY: Your Honor, I think the defendant will 
plead guilty. The nature of the agreement, your Honor, is 
that Mr. Dean is going to plead guilty to Counts I, III and V. 
Count I is child abuse, a second-degree felony. Count III is 
child abuse, a Class A misdemeanor, and Count V is assault, a 
Class B misdemeanor. 
In addition — or in exchange for his pleas, the State 
will move to dismiss the remaining charges, and has agreed not 
to file charges of witness tampering arising from alleged 
threats to the children. 
THE COURT: First of all, does he want to waive his 
right to a preliminary hearing? 
MR. SESSIONS: He does. 
THE COURT: He's held over for arraignment at this 
time. I have a statement of the defendant regarding plea 
bargain, specific that his Counsel has ordered, that was 
-3 
initials by each of the 16 paragraphs. 
MR. SESSIONS: Your Honor, while you're reviewing that 
I would like to explain a couple of things about this 
agreement. 
THE COURT: I see a lot of interlineation there on the 
16th. Go ahead. 
MR. SESSIONS: Okay, let's see, the first change, the 
first time is paragraph 9. There was a word written above 
the word coersion. It is stricken and initialed by me and my 
client for the Court to disregard it. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. SESSIONS: Likewise, on paragraph 16 there was an 
Information included at the bottom of the document, which has 
been lined through and stricken. It has my initials and my 
client's initials, for the Court to disregard it as well. 
THE COURT: All right. So are these your initials by 
each of the 16 paragraphs? 
MR. DEAN: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Did you place them there after you first 
read each and all 16 paragraphs? 
MR. DEAN: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: And are you in agreement with what your 
attorney just said regarding what's written here, handwriting? 
MR. DEAN: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Okay. What is your plea*to Count I, child 
-4-
abuse, sex abuse? 
MR. DEAN: Guilty plea. 
THE COURT: Count IIIf child abus'e, a Class A second-
degree misdemeanor? 
MR. DEAN: Guilty plea. 
THE COURT: Count V, assault, a Class B misdemeanor? 
MR. DEAN: Guilty. 
THE COURT: All right. The remaining counts are all 
dismissed. Factual basis? 
MR. DOXEY: Yes, your Honor. During 1999 the State's 
evidence is the defendant heated up a knife, and placed it on 
his daughter's stomach and burned her. She still has a scar as 
a result of this. Then on January 7th, 2000 the defendant beat 
up his wife on the day before she died. She was on her death 
bed. That is the allegation of the assault, and then his son 
attempted to render aid to his mother, ke grabbed his son by 
the throat and choked him. That is the allegation for the 
child abuse. 
THE COURT: Okay. I assume that the wife's death was 
not — we won't be looking at a murder case? 
MR. DOXEY: It's not a murder case, your Honor. He 
beat her up. She was dying of a kidney or a liver disease. 
THE COURT: Anything you want to add to or dispute that 
summary? 
MR. SESSIONS: While my client does*not agree with the 
-5-
State's evidence, he understands that that is the State's 
evidence, and that they would be able to produce that evidence. 
THE COURT: Do you engage in any alcohol or drugs, 
including any prescription medication from a doctor that would 
affect your judgment at this time? 
MR. DEAN: No, sir. 
THE COURT: Set this for sentencing with a pre-sentence 
report. We'll go with April 11th at 1:30 for the sentencing. 
MR. DOXEY: Your Honor, there is a couple of other 
matters I'd like the Court to take into consideration on this 
case. 
THE COURT: Oh, okay. 
MR. DOXEY: Now that he's pled guilty to three counts, 
the remainder has been dismissed, there are a few issues. He 
was originally brought before the Court on a no-bail warrant. 
He'd like to have that removed, or recalled from the other 
case, and I apologize I don't have a number, but there is 
another case with that hold. 
THE COURT: That's one that he's on supervised 
probation? 
MR. SESSIONS: Yes. Then the other issue is in this 
particular case I believe bail has been set at $2,500, and with 
these changes, he — and the understanding that he would help 
cooperate, and he has assured me that he will cooperate with 
the CSI in preparation, he would like to be released, be able 
to make arrangements to move out of his home. He's aware of 
that. So he would at least ask the Court to reduce bail to 
a $5,000 bond, so that he can secure a bond and be released 
between now and April 11th to make those arrangements. 
THE COURT: State's position? 
MR. DOXEY: Your Honor, the State opposes the motion 
to reduce the bail and to lift the no-bail hold on him. 
For the record, your Honor, in his previous cases, 
case No. 961500370, a no-bail warrant — a no-bail order, 
rather, was placed on him for numerous reasons. First, that 
he has continued to violate his probation and disregard many 
of the conditions of his probation. 
Secondly, your Honor, the crimes which he has just 
pled guilty to are extremely violent. He has perpetrated 
against his two children and his deceased wife. Since the 
investigation has begun, Mr. Dean has threatened to kill his 
children if they testify against him. 
We believe, your Honor, there's a substantial risk of 
Mr. Dean hurting his children. Right now they have to have 
protective custody, but we believe there's a substantial risk 
of — we are in possession, your Honor, of a journal from his 
wife that outline the defendant's actions throughout the year. 
THE COURT: I don't deny the fact that he's been on, 
then, for no other reason he's on probation with the Court 
already, supervised, and his many serious offenses which he' s 
-7 
1 | just pled guilty, I can't imagine that he wouldn't receive at 
2 I least as many days in jail as are between now and sentencing. 
3 I The statute allows me to after a conviction, which has just 
4 I occurred, to commit a person to jail pending sentencing, so 
5 I that's what I'm doing. 
6 MR. DOXEY: Thank you, your Honor. 
7 (Hearing concluded.) 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
EXHIBIT "K" 
Order on Motion Withdraw Guilty Plea. 
. DAVID E. DOXEY (7506) 
Deputy Iron County Attorney 
97 North Main, Suite #1 
P.O. Box 42 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 
Telephone: (435) 586-6694 
Facsimile: (435) 586-2737 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
WALLACE DEAN 
Defendant 
ORDER ON MOTION TO WITHDRAW 
GUILTY PLEA 
CASE NO. 001500153 
JUDGE ROBERT T. BRAITHWAITE 
THE COURT having considered the MOTION TO WITHDRAW GUILTY PLEA, 
hereby denies said motion on the grounds set forth in the State's lesponse. 
DATED this J/_ day of April, 2000 
BY THE COURT 
JUDGE ROBERT T. BRAITHWAITE 
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State v. Dean 
This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
•ooOoo-
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Wallace Dean, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
OPINION 
(For Official Publication) 
Case No. 20000340-CA 
F I L E D 
October 3, 2002 
2002 UT App 323 
ct, Cedar City Department 
rable Robert T. Braithwaite 
ackson, Cedar City, for Appellant 
lurtleff and Jeanne B. Inouye, Salt Lake City, for Appellee 
Jges Jackson, Bench, and Greenwood. 
, Presiding Judge: 
BACKGROUND 
ch 8, 2000, Dean pleaded guilty to one count of child abuse, a second degree felony, one count of child abuse, a class A misdemeanor, and assault, a 
sdemeanor. In connection with his plea, he executed a statement that detailed the constitutional rights he was waiving. Dean initialed each paragraph of 
ent. Before accepting his guilty pleas, the trial court asked Dean if he had read the statement that he had executed and initialed each of the paragraphs, 
rered affirmatively, and proceeded to plead guilty to the above-listed charges. Dean was not advised, either in his signed statement or by the trial court, 
> waiving not only his right to a jury trial, but also his right to a speedy trial before an impartial jury. 
110, 2000, Dean filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. He argued that the trial court failed to strictly comply with rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
in two ways. He first argued, incorrectly, that he had not been advised of the time limit for filing a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. However, the court did 
of the thirty-day deadline. He did not specify the basis for the second violation. On April 11, 2000, Dean was convicted and sentenced after the trial court 
motion to withdraw his guilty plea. He appeals that denial and his conviction. 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
gues for the first time on appeal that the trial court committed plain error because he was never advised of his right to a speedy trial by an impartial jury, 
I to a mere trial by a jury. Dean filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, but on appeal challenges the denial of that motion "for the first time on appeal [on 
lat the trial court failed to inform him of his right[s] to a speedy trial" and an impartial jury. State v. Hittle. 2002 UT App 134,^5, 47 P.3d 101. Thus, he 
' [that the trial court committed] plain error. To succeed on a claim of plain error, a defendant has the burden of showing (i) [a]n error exists; (ii) the error 
3 been obvious to-the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful." I d (quotations and citations omitted). 
ANALYSIS 
I. Jurisdiction 
reaching the issue Dean raises, we address the State's argument that we lack jurisdiction to review Dean's plain error argument. In order to effectively 
ie State's jurisdictional challenge, we first sketch Utah's previous decisions relating to challenges to guilty pleas. 
e v. Gibbons, the supreme court held that "Rule 11(e) squarely places on trial courts the burden of ensuring that constitutional and Rule 11(e) requirements 
ied with when a guilty plea is entered." 740 P.2d 1309, 1312 (Utah 1987).0> However, 
|n Gibbons, the Supreme Court determined that a defendant could not simply appeal a conviction based on a guilty plea. Rather, defendant must 
rst fiie a motion to withdraw [his] plea, giving the court who took the plea the first chance to consider defendant's arguments. If the motion is 
enied, defendant could then appeal-not from the conviction per se, but from the denial of the motion. 
v. Cook. 759 P.2di341, 342-43 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). If a defendant fails to file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, he may only attack his guilty plea 
/. See id. 
i guilty plea has been entered, a defendant has thirty days from "the entry of final judgment of conviction at the district court" to file a motion to withdraw his 
State v. Ostler. 2001 UT 68,1)11 & n.3, 31 P.3d 528 (Ostler II). We have previously held that the time limit on withdrawing a guilty plea is jurisdictional. See 
rice, 837 P.2d 578, 582-84 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). "Accordingly, if a defendant is advised of the deadline when the plea is entered, the trial court lacks 
l to consider a motion to withdraw filed after the thirty-day period." State v. Canfield. 917 P.2d 561 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). Nevertheless, "in State v. Ostler. 
\pp 28, 996 P.2d 1065 (Ostler I), this court recognized a narrow exception to the jurisdictional rule in Price. We concluded that although district courts lack 
l under Price to consider the merits of untimely motions to withdraw guilty pleas, we may review alleged violations of Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
)... for plain error." State v. Melo. 2001 UT App 392.D4, 40 P.3d 646; accord State v. Tarnawiecki. 2000 UT App 186,1)11, 5 P.3d 1222. 
preme court recently eliminated this exception to the jurisdictional rule, stating that because the appellant failed to file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, 
acked jurisdiction to address his challenge to the plea, even for plain error. See State v. Reyes. 2002 UT 13,1)1)3-4, 40 P.3d 630 ("This court may choose to 
issue not properly preserved for plain error. It cannot, however, use plain error to reach an issue over which it has no jurisdiction." (Internal citation 
Thus, the supreme court declined to hear Reyes's plain error argument, which directly attacked his guilty plea. See id. 
^eyes, the State asserts that because Dean's motion to withdraw his plea "did not claim the errors now alleged on appeal," his motion was somehow 
t to allow appellate jurisdiction. Thus, the State argues that Dean's appeal amounts to nothing more than a direct attack on his guilty plea rather than a 
to the denial of his motion to withdraw. 
er, in Reyes, the supreme court did not address the sufficiency of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea. Rather, it stated that the defendant must file his 
hin the thirty-day deadline. Se_ejo\ Unlike the defendant in Reyes. Dean filed a timely motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Thus, although Dean failed to 
j basis for his motion to withdraw, the supreme court's ruling in Reyes does not preclude this court from reviewing his plain error argument. Accordingly, we 
challenge under the plain error standard. 
II. Plain Error 
argues for the first time on appeal that the trial court committed plain error because he was never advised of his right to a speedy trial by an impartial jury, 
d to a mere trial by a jury. As we concluded in Hittle. which discussed identical issues, "[t]he trial court did not strictly comply with rule 11 because it failed 
)efendant of his right[s] to a speedy [public] trial [and an impartial jury] either orally or in the plea affidavit. Therefore, the trial court erred."ffiHittle, 2002 UT 
IH6 (concluding the trial court erred after analyzing Tarnawiecki). 
tate argues that State v. Martinez. 2001 UT 12, 26 P.3d 203 "is inconsistent with the decisions] in Tarnawiecki [and Hittle] and, by implication, overrules" 
ntends that "nothing [in Martinez]... suggested that the trial court had used the terms impartial and speedy, [yet] the [supreme court] nonetheless held 
lloquy 'strictly complied' with rule 11." However, nothing in Martinez suggests that the trial court had not used these terms in the plea colloquy. Moreover, 
e rights these terms convey were communicated to the defendant in Martinez was not an issue before the court in that case. See id. Thus, we cannot say 
ez overrules Tarnawiecki and Hittle. 
'in light of [State v. Visser. 1999 UT App 19, 973 P.2d 998 (Visser I), rev'd on other grounds by Visser ll. 2000 UT 88, 22 P.3d 124213)] and Rule 11, the 
d have been obvious to the trial court." Tarnawiecki. 2000 UT App 186 at U18. 
lally, the trial court's omission was harmful because the omission dealt with a substantial constitutional right. It is well established under Utah law 
it we will presume harm under plain error analysis when a trial court fails to inform a defendant of his constitutional rights under rule 11. See, e.g.. 
irnawiecki. 2000 UT App 186 at 1]18 (presuming harm when trial court failed to inform Defendant that she was entitled to a "speedy trial before an 
partial jury"); State v. Ostler. 2000 UT App 28,111125-26, 996 P.2d 1065 (presuming harm where trial court failed to inform defendant that he would 
live certain constitutional rights by pleading guilty) 
I UT App 134 at H9 (^ rst citation omitted). Accordingly, the trial court committed plain error by failing to advise Dean of his right to a speedy trial before an 
ry.(4) 
CONCLUSION 
iuse the trial court committed plain error in advising [Dean] of his rights, we reverse [the denial of Dean's motion to withdraw his plea, vacate his conviction] 
id for proceedings consistent with this opinion." k l at 1|11. 
. Jackson, 
Judge 
ICUR: 
Greenwood, Judgp 
ions, this court adopted a 'strict compliance' test which superseded the 'record as a whole' test traditionally applied on review in cases dealing with knowing 
ary guilty pleas." State v. Maquire. 830 P.2d 216, 217 (Utah 1991). 
te correctly notes that "[s]trict compliance . . . does not mandate a particular script or rote recitation of the rights listed." State v. Visser. 2000 UT 88,1111, 
>42 (VisseiJI). However, "'the trial court [must] . . . establish on the record that the defendant knowingly waived his or her constitutional rights,'" |d. (citation 
D a "'speedy public trial before an impartial Jury.'" Id. at 1)10 (quoting Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e)). This is a greater right than a mere right to a jury trial. Thus, 
le terms "impartial" and "speedy" may be communicated by various means to the defendant, they may not be considered merely inconsequential modifiers 
trial right. Here, nothing in the record suggests the trial court established that Dean knowingly waived anything more than a right to a potentially partial and 
ry trial. 
sent argues that "Tarnawiecki's reliance upon [Visser I] is . . . suspect given that Visser I was reversed by the Utah Supreme Court in [Visser II]." However, 
as decided on November 14, 2000, after both Tarnawjecki, which was decided on June 15, 2000, and the trial court's denial of Dean's motion to withdraw 
lea on April 11, 2000. Thus, the trial court in this case was still constrained by YteseM as of the date of its denial of Dean's motion to withdraw. 
the supreme court reversed Vjs_seiJ not because a defendant is not entitled to be informed of his right to a speedy trial before an impartial jury, but 
le record in that case reflected that Visser had been informed of his rights. In Visser II. the supreme court held 
at the trial court's colloquy, in light of the mid-trial context of the plea, provided an adequate basis in the record to conclude that the trial court 
ictly complied with rule 1 1 . . . . [T]he record details Visser's personal trial experience up to the point of his plea agreement. We conclude that this 
perience communicated at least as much as would the mere oral recitation of the "right to a speedy public trial before an impartial jury." 
000 UT 88,1)13, 22 P.3d 1242 (emphasis added). 
ent case, Dean's plea was not taken in a mid-trial context. Because the trial court's colloquy was given in a mid-trial context and there was no indication 
il had been delayed, the supreme court in Visser II assumed that Visser had already received the benefit of his speedy trial right. See id. at U14. Similarly, 
te court held that Visser's participation in his own jury selection process was instrumental in ensuring that his plea was voluntary. See id. at 1|16. In the 
se, Dean's trial had not yet begun, and the jury had not yet been selected. Thus, we cannot say that the record in this case reflects "at least as much as 
nere oral recitation of the 'right to a speedy public trial before an impartial jury.'" IdL at U13. 
f this decision, we decline to address Dean's remaining arguments. 
idge (dissenting): 
ctfully dissent. I cannot say that the trial court "plainly erred" in not advising Defendant of his right to a "speedy" trial by an "impartial" jury. 
iblish plain error a defendant must show that "'(1) an error exists; (2) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (3) the error was harmful.. 
Ross. 951 P.2d 236, 238 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (citation omitted) (emphasis added). "Utah courts have repeatedly held that a trial court's error is not plain 
3 is no settled appellate law to guide the trial court." id, at 239; see also State v. Braun. 787 P.2d 1336,1341-42 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (rejecting a claim of 
a/here "'the trial court did not have the benefit of [a later] appellate decision'" (citation omitted) (alteration in original)). I disagree with the majority's 
that the trial court's error in not advising Defendant of his rights should have been obvious to the trial court in light of State v. Hittle. 2002 UT App 134, 47 
nd Sta_te_v. JLarrmv^ecki, 2000 UT App 186, 5 P.3d 1222. Both of these cases were decided after Defendant in this case had entered his plea. Therefore, I 
ow these decisions could have been obvious to the trial court. Tamawjeckj's reliance upon State v. Visser. 1999 UT App 19, 973 P.2d 998, (VLsseM), is 
:t given that Visser I was reversed by the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Visser. 2000 UT 88, 22 P.3d 1242 (Visser II). 
v in this area remains unclear and unsettled. There is some question as to whether we even have jurisdiction to address Defendant's rule 11 arguments. 
tan R. Crim. P. 11. Defendant entered his plea on March 8, 2000 and moved to withdraw it 33 days later, on April 10, 2000. After denying his motion, the trial 
•entenced Defendant on April 11, 2000. State v. Ostler. 2001 UT 68,1111,31 P.3d 528, held that "the thirty-day limitation on filing a motion to withdraw a plea of 
>r no contest runs from the date of final disposition of the case" and not from the date of the plea colloquy. However, in a later case, State v. Reyes. 2002 UT 
40 P.3d 630, the Utah Supreme Court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain the defendant's rule 11 arguments because the defendant "did not 
o withdraw his guilty plea within thirty days after the entry of the plea." (Emphasis added.) Although Reyes cites Ostler. I cannot say that Reyes overruled 
See State v. Menzies. 889 P.2d 393, 398-99 (Utah 1994) (discussing the standard for overruling precedent). 
rthermore, there is some question as to whether a trial court must use the terms "speedy" trial and "impartial" jury, in order to strictly comply with the 
ments of rule 11. In StatejyJvlartinez, 2001 UT 12,1)22, 26 P.3d 203 and Visser II, our supreme court seems to intend to overrule Tarnawiecki and its 
y, but this was never done expressly. I therefore cannot say that Tarnawiecki and Hittle have been overruled. SeeMenzies, 889 P.2d at 398-99. 
Martinez, the Utah Supreme Court concluded that the district court strictly complied with rule 11 by informing the defendant about "the right to a jury trial." 
T 12 at UH22-25. No use of the words "speedy" trial or "impartial" jury were needed to meet the requirements of rule 11. In Visser II, the supreme court stated 
|trict compliance,... does not mandate a particular script or rote recitation of the rights listed" and "[s]trict compliance does not require a specific method of 
nicating the rights enumerated by rule 11." VisserJJ, 2000 UT 88 at 1)1)11,13. The court then proceeded to conclude that the trial court strictly complied with 
although it did not specifically inform the defendant of his "'right to a speedy public trial before an impartial jury."' Id. at 1)13. 
contrast, Tarnawiecki concluded that the trial court plainly erred when it failed to specifically inform the defendant of her right to a speedy trial before an 
il jury. See Tarnawiecki. 2000 UT App 186 at 1)1)16-20. Tarnawiecki relied upon the court of appeals decision in Vjsseil, which the supreme court later 
d in Visser II. Hittle then relies upon Tarnawiecki. in concluding that "the trial court . . . [plainly erred by failing] to advise [djefendant of his substantial 
tional right to a speedy trial." Hittle. 2002 UT App 134 at 1)10. 
:ause the cases in this area are so inconsistent, the supreme court should reevaluate the caselaw and set up some base-line rules that are clear and easy to 
n so doing, it should expressly overrule inconsistent cases.^ Q 
;ed on the foregoing, I cannot say that the trial court plainly erred. I would therefore affirm. 
W. Bench, Judge 
oversies such as the one before us should be relatively easy to avoid as a practical matter. The problem we now face could have been avoided if the plea 
;nt had exactly tracked the rights mentioned in rule 11. In the modern era of word processing and computers, it would not be difficult to modify existing forms 
are new ones) that precisely track a defendant's rule 11 rights. 
